[Surveillance-Studies-l] Fwd: Homeland Security Cost-Benefit Analysis

[Nils Zurawski]

das ist sicherlich was für manche auf der Liste.

liebe Grüße

nilz

>Reply-To:     Jens Schade <jens.schade at GMAIL.COM>
>Sender:       Research and teaching on 
>surveillance <SURVEILLANCE at JISCMAIL.AC.UK>
>From:         Jens Schade <jens.schade at GMAIL.COM>
>Subject: Homeland Security Cost-Benefit Analysis
>To:           SURVEILLANCE at JISCMAIL.AC.UK
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>who would like to do a c/b-analysis of surveillance measures?
>
>>This is an excellent paper by Ohio State political science professor
>>>John Mueller. Titled "The Quixotic Quest for 
>>>Invulnerability: Assessing the Costs, 
>>>Benefits, and Probabilities of Protecting the 
>>>Homeland," it lays out some common send 
>>>premises and policy implications.
>>>
>>>The premises:
>>>
>>>  1. The number of potential terrorist targets is essentially infinite.
>>>
>>>  2. The probability that any individual target 
>>>will be attacked is essentially zero.
>>>
>>>  3. If one potential target happens to enjoy a 
>>>degree of protection, the agile terrorist 
>>>usually can readily move on to another one.
>>>
>>>  4. Most targets are "vulnerable" in that it 
>>>is not very difficult to damage them, but 
>>>invulnerable in that they can be rebuilt in 
>>>fairly short order and at tolerable expense.
>>>
>>>  5. It is essentially impossible to make a 
>>>very wide variety of potential terrorist 
>>>targets invulnerable except by completely 
>>>closing them down.
>>>
>>>The policy implications:
>>>
>>>  1. Any protective policy should be compared 
>>>to a "null case": do nothing, and use the 
>>>money saved to rebuild and to compensate any 
>>>victims.
>>>
>>>  2. Abandon any effort to imagine a terrorist target list.
>>>
>>>  3. Consider negative effects of protection 
>>>measures: not only direct cost, but 
>>>inconvenience, enhancement of fear, negative 
>>>economic impacts, reduction of liberties.
>>>
>>>  4. Consider the opportunity costs, the tradeoffs, of protection measures.
>>>
>>>Here's the abstract:
>>>
>>>  This paper attempts to set out some general 
>>>parameters for coming to grips with a central 
>>>homeland security concern: the effort to make 
>>>potential targets invulnerable, or at least 
>>>notably less vulnerable, to terrorist attack. 
>>>It argues that protection makes sense only 
>>>when protection is feasible for an entire 
>>>class of potential targets and when the 
>>>destruction of something in that target set 
>>>would have quite large physical, economic, 
>>>psychological, and/or political consequences. 
>>>There are a very large number of potential 
>>>targets where protection is essentially a 
>>>waste of resources and a much more limited one 
>>>where it may be effective.
>>>
>>>The whole paper is worth reading.
>>>http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ISA2008.pdf
>>>http://www.schneier.com/blog/
>>
>>
>
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-- 
Dr. Nils Zurawski
Institut für Volkskunde/Kulturanthropologie
Universität Hamburg
ESA 1 (Flügelbau West)
Edmund-Siemers-Allee 1
20146 Hamburg
tel. +49 40 42838 7421

Projekt: Konsumkontrolltechnologien

http://www.surveillance-studies.org/blog